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Comment on this article History, the Second Time Around? In September 1963, I was called to a White House meeting to hear the views of two investigators just back from Vietnam, who had been dispatched to determine whether the mounting Buddhist protests against President Ngo Dinh Diem were fatally undermining the war effort. Their findings varied so widely that President Kennedy asked, "The two of you did visit the same country, didn't you?" After some four years of direct involvement on Vietnam, I knew the situation was bad but not hopeless. I recommended Kennedy send out the one American truly trusted by Diem, General Edward Lansdale, to persuade Diem to exile his deeply unpopular brother—the main source of discontent in the country. Kennedy listened attentively and thanked me for recommending Lansdale. But other voices prevailed. Instead of choosing Lansdale and the subtle art of political persuasion, Kennedy sent Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor. Their angry demands that Diem hew to U.S. policies inflamed his national and personal pride. Thus the Buddhist protests escalated, and the option that Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. had favored all along—a coup by the Vietnamese military, covertly encouraged by the Americans—became the only option. Four years later, the Vietnamese held a presidential election. Ambassador Lodge now chose to insist that the United States stay out of Vietnamese internal affairs. Richard Holbrooke, then working at the White House, disagreed, pointing out that "with our present civil/military involvement in Vietnam we are involved in everything, including politics, either by omission or commission." But the United States failed to support a change to civilian rule, and our inaction guaranteed the continuation of military-led government. We made a similar mistake in the election of 1971: by failing to object to President Nguyen Van Thieu's use of illegal means to eliminate all opposition, we guaranteed that he would run for "reelection" unchallenged. Today we face a similar political challenge in Afghanistan. The Afghans will hold presidential elections in August. Will our stand be essentially non-interference, while the incumbent, Hamid Karzai, is able to use his administration to tilt the playing field illegally in his favor? Or will we insist—because of our core beliefs and because we are paying a substantial part of the election costs, that we have the right to interfere—on the principle that the Afghan government must observe its own election laws? Those laws promise equal treatment for all candidates and make it illegal to use government means to affect the outcome. As with most insurgencies, the struggle in Afghanistan is for the allegiance of the Afghan people, and only the Afghans can win it. Our current limited objective of eradicating al Qaeda can only be done by helping the Afghan government win the support of its people, a lengthy process for which there is no simple or certain solution. The Taliban are fighting for the acquiescence and allegiance of the population through military force, intimidation, rough justice, and harsh but functioning governance fueled by religious fervor. To win, the Afghan government must commit itself with equal fervor to protect its people—not just itself and the fortunes of its leaders—and to provide just, responsive, and honest governance. Unfortunately, torpor and corruption currently sap this political cause and undercut the morale needed to empower and sustain it. Opinion polls in Afghanistan, with a five-year reasonably accurate history, show the country to be more than a tribal and ethnic conglomeration; there are clear signs of a sense of national identity and belief in democracy. Seventy percent of Afghans identify themselves as Afghans first and as members of a particular ethnic group second. More than 60 percent share a strong preference for democracy, which they equate with peace and freedom. Favorable ratings of the Taliban remain low—about 10 percent. If the national government could realize, not undermine, its citizens' aspirations, the Taliban cause would eventually wither and with it any sanctuary for al Qaeda. From this perspective, Afghanistan's upcoming presidential elections loom as potentially critical. If the Afghan people view these elections as unfair and dishonest, Afghan morale and belief in democratic self-government will be severely eroded. Our stake in honest elections is also significant at home. As the U.S. perception of unfair elections in 1967 and 1971 helped undermine U.S. public support for the Vietnam War, so will it for this war if our troops are seen to be dying to prop up a corrupt government. On the other hand, if honest elections begin to restore the credibility of the Afghan government, American support for the longer haul could well endure. Achieving a fair, free, and transparent election will not be easy. President Karzai has the levers of power at his fingertips in an administration open to cronyism and payoff, and the temptation to abuse such powers will be strong. At least two credible opponents exist, however, who have credible credentials if untested levels of public support: a former foreign minister named Abdullah and a former finance minister, Ashraf Ghani. The law requires that the election go to a second round if the initial winner captures less than 50 percent of the vote—making this contest more open than may initially appear. Even though the odds currently favor Karzai, enforcing an honest election process could oblige him to address charges of corruption, to pledge reforms, and even to begin enacting reforms during the campaign. If this were to happen, then, no matter who won, Afghanistan would be better off. There are several strong actions the United States can take to help ensure a level campaign playing field. We can insist on equal media access for all candidates, using our own media resources if necessary. We can strengthen the existing joint (foreign and Afghan) Election Complaints Commission by arranging for additional funding and logistical support. We can give moral support to the Fair and Free Elections Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA), an independent nonprofit group founded by Afghan citizens. We can deploy Coalition security forces, combined with the Afghan army and non-corrupt police units, to provide not just protection for the polls during voting and vote counting, but also on-the-ground pre-election monitoring. President Obama's representation in Afghanistan faces two paths—whether to insist forcefully on fair elections, thereby risking a possible period of difficult relations with President Karzai's administration; or to go through the motions, in the interest of "getting on with the war" (the common excuse for political inaction in Vietnam). Indeed, vigorous efforts to level the playing field may very well raise the political temperature. But on the free election issue, we stand on higher moral ground. Are we willing to risk a temporary period of political tension in view of the greater long-term political benefits a fair election could bring to all? On
June 16, President Obama stated that the United States should "help the Afghans
ensure a credible, secure, and inclusive election process in which all
candidates have fair access to media, can freely travel and campaign, and are
comfortable with the integrity of the ballots cast on election day." The
question is to what extent we will use our influence in Afghanistan to meet
these goals.
History, the third time around? Counting Iraq, Afghanistan is our third Vietnam: an ill-considered, gratuitous, bloody invasion of a small, remote, vulnerable country of whose history, language, and culture we know little, and in which we have no national interest.
On troops and civilians I found Rufus Phillips's article of interest. Somewhere in the back of my mind, I feel I had met him somewhere during the Viet Nam "crisis" as I was all tangled up in it as an AID provincial Representative and later at the Deptarment of State. I have no bones to pick with Mr. Phillips with the exception of one omission—that of our troops' behavior toward the civilian population (which in Viet Nam, at least where I was, was not as bad as what has been happening in Iraq and probably Afghanistan). Admittedly, the political structure and determination of policy in the respective governments is a vital and necessary part of any counter-insurgency war. However, the part that is most often missed is that the soldier is the ambassador to the people, and it is his behavior that can swing a counter-insurgency war to one side or the other. A counter-insurgency (maybe it could better be called an 'internal') war is dependent on the support of the people (Mao and Lenin knew this quite well!), and considering that the average person sees the soldier more often than the statesman, it is he that has to show care and compassion in his work. Unfortunately, compassion is not a trait that is taught when learning about conventional warfare, which is apparently what our military is taught, nor is it shown by conventional military leaders, or by the intelligence agencies. In Iraq, Abu Ghraib should have never happened, and our leadership should have never followed it up within weeks with a talk on how America cares for man's worth regardless of skin color. One soldier (or U.S. civilian) should not be able to yank a man off the street and throw him into jail 'on suspicion' and certainly not allowed to shoot him (or her) on those grounds. Our troops should not be allowed to machine-gun blocks of civilian houses (as seen on TV) on suspicion that there may be enemies there. This breeds wholesale opposition, and rightly so. Forces sent to fight a counter-insurgency war, among other things, should be trained to be compassionate ambassadors as well as technicians. Only in that way can counter-insurgency wars be truly won, regardless of how many victories 'with honor' we claim. My crystal ball says we will have many more of such wars in the future, enough, possibly, to bring us to our knees.
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